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Linux Kernel 2.6 Syscall Hooking via the Interrupt Descriptor Table




推荐:Button input interrupt under linux kernel send message to touch screen

/**************************************************************** * OFN/ts.c * * Copyright (c) 2011-11-24 * * light*****************************

The symbol of sys_call_table is no longer exported since Linux 2.6.x, we have to HACK it

Ever since the system call table stopped being exported in the linux kernel it has been some what of a pain to hook system calls in the traditional manner - that is - by directly modifying the pointer entries of sys_call_table. And let me first say that this article does not contain some new, magical method of doing so. The methods in this article have been used before to intercept syscalls, but in my search for answers to this dilemma, I found that most sources were outdated or incomplete.

So here I present to you a complete kernel module which intercepts the uname syscall by modifying the sys_call_table. Topics covered include:

An introduction to the Interrupt Descriptor Table and Software Interrupts as a method of calling the kernel

  • Locating the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) using inline x86 assembly from C
  • Locating the linux system call Interrupt Handling Routine via the IDT
  • Scanning the INT 0x80 (system call) handler to locate the address of the linux system call table

We'll also touch on memory page protection when we get to the point of actually modifying thesys_call_table.


CRC: Cyclic redundancy check 循环冗余校验 具体的计算原理与方法参考: 内核中使用的crc16计算方法位

First let's talk briefly about interrupts. Interrupts are a way of getting the CPU's attention. They come from either hardware or software. In this case, we're just interested in software interrupts. Programs may raise a number of different software interrupts using the x86 INT instruction. The INTinstruction takes exactly one operand, which is the interrupt number that you would like to raise. The two most common software interrupts are INT 3 and INT 0x80. The former is commonly used for debugging programs (and is of little interest to us) and the latter is a special mechanism available to user space programs providing a "gateway" to the kernel. In practice, it allows users to make system calls, like write() or fork() directly, as opposed to using wrapper functions in libc and elsewhere. Below is a simple "Hello World" example of using INT 0x80 to make a system call.

System Calls from Assembly

section .text
  global main

HW db 'Hello World', 0xa

  mov edx, 12
  mov ecx, HW
  mov ebx, 1
  mov eax, 4
  int 0x80

  xor eax,eax
  int 0x80

In this example, the write() system call is being used. The string length, string pointer, output stream, and system call number are stored in edxecxebx, and eax respectively. Finally, INT 0x80 is called and write() is executed. The real question is, what happens after INT 0x80 is called and before the next instruction is executed?
Well, you may have been wondering what significance the argument to the INT instruction has. Let me answer this question by introducing something called the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), also known as the Interrupt {Vector, Routine, Handler, etc.} Table. The IDT is nothing more than a special array of entries that describe various event handling routines. When I say events, I mean interrupts (software and hardware), exceptions, and traps. The argument passed to the INT instruction is nothing more than an offset into this array. So INT 0x80 looks up the 0x80th (128th) interrupt gate (table entry) in the IDT and executes it.
So what exactly is the 0x80th interrupt gate?
Every time the linux bootstraps itself, it populates the IDT. Interrupt gates are created for various devices and exceptions that may occur. Things like page faults and division by zero are handled through the IDT. The INT 0x80th handler is just like any other handler except it is called from user-space with the sole purpose of entering kernel-space and basically utilizing the kernel API.

Interrupt 0x80 Handler

Let's take a look at part of the INT 0x80th handler, straight from arch/x86/kernel/entry_32.S in the kernel source tree.

         cmpl $(nr_syscalls), %eax
         jae syscall_badsys
         call *sys_call_table(,%eax,4)

Recall that when making a system call, eax stores the syscall number. The first two lines ofsysenter_do_call check to make sure that eax contains a number within the bounds of thesys_call_table, and if it is valid, executes the syscall. Note that each "entry" in the sys_call_table is a pointer, which is 4 bytes, so eax is multiplied by 4 to obtain the correct offset. So when the instruction INT 0x80 is executed, the 0x80th interrupt handler is triggered, which in linux is the system call handler. Inside of the system call handler, the value passed in eax is used as an offset into the sys_call_table. As mentioned before, the sys_call_table is merely a list of pointers to available system calls (functions).
What if we could change those pointers?

Modifying the Linux Syscall Table

The code below is a Linux kernel module that locates the system call table and hooks the unamesyscall upon initialization. The original syscall table is restored when the module is removed.
This code is x86 specific and should be run in a VM to avoid any (un)happy accidents.

To hook a syscall, the code does the following:

  1. Locates the Interrupt Descriptor Table using the sidt instruction.
  2. Locates the syscall handler routine through the IDT.
  3. Locates the system call table (sys_call_table) by scanning for a known code pattern in memory in the syscall handler.
  4. Saves the state of the sys_call_table.
  5. Disables memory protection on the sys_call_table.
  6. Overwrites entries in the sys_call_table with pointers to the hooked functions.

Kernel Module Code that Hooks uname

* This kernel module locates the sys_call_table by scanning
* the system_call interrupt handler (int 0x80)
* Author: Elliot Bradbury 2010

#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>


// see desc_def.h and desc.h in arch/x86/include/asm/
// and arch/x86/kernel/syscall_64.c

typedef void (*sys_call_ptr_t)(void);
typedef asmlinkage long (*orig_uname_t)(struct new_utsname *);

void hexdump(unsigned char *addr, unsigned int length) {
    unsigned int i;
    for(i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        if(!((i+1) % 16)) {
            printk("%02x\n", *(addr + i));
        } else {
            if(!((i+1) % 4)) {
                printk("%02x  ", *(addr + i));
            } else {
                printk("%02x ", *(addr + i));

    if(!((length+1) % 16)) {

// fptr to original uname syscall
orig_uname_t orig_uname = NULL;

// test message
char *msg = "All ur base r belong to us";

asmlinkage long hooked_uname(struct new_utsname *name) {

    strncpy(name->sysname, msg, 27);

    return 0;

// and finally, sys_call_table pointer
sys_call_ptr_t *_sys_call_table = NULL;

// memory protection shinanigans
unsigned int level;
pte_t *pte;

// initialize the module
int init_module() {
    printk("+ Loading module\n");

    // struct for IDT register contents
    struct desc_ptr idtr;

    // pointer to IDT table of desc structs
    gate_desc *idt_table;

    // gate struct for int 0x80
    gate_desc *system_call_gate;

    // system_call (int 0x80) offset and pointer
    unsigned int _system_call_off;
    unsigned char *_system_call_ptr;

    // temp variables for scan
    unsigned int i;
    unsigned char *off;

    // store IDT register contents directly into memory
    asm ("sidt %0" : "=m" (idtr));

    // print out location
    printk("+ IDT is at %08x\n", idtr.address);

    // set table pointer
    idt_table = (gate_desc *) idtr.address;

    // set gate_desc for int 0x80
    system_call_gate = &idt_table[0x80];

    // get int 0x80 handler offset
    _system_call_off = (system_call_gate->a & 0xffff) | (system_call_gate->b & 0xffff0000);
    _system_call_ptr = (unsigned char *) _system_call_off;

    // print out int 0x80 handler
    printk("+ system_call is at %08x\n", _system_call_off);

    // print out the first 128 bytes of system_call() ...notice pattern below
    hexdump((unsigned char *) _system_call_off, 128);

    // scan for known pattern in system_call (int 0x80) handler
    // pattern is just before sys_call_table address
    for(i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
        off = _system_call_ptr + i;
        if(*(off) == 0xff && *(off+1) == 0x14 && *(off+2) == 0x85) {
            _sys_call_table = *(sys_call_ptr_t **)(off+3);

    // bail out if the scan came up empty
    if(_sys_call_table == NULL) {
        printk("- unable to locate sys_call_table\n");
        return 0;

    // print out sys_call_table address
    printk("+ found sys_call_table at %08x!\n", _sys_call_table);

    // now we can hook syscalls ...such as uname
    // first, save the old gate (fptr)
    orig_uname = (orig_uname_t) _sys_call_table[__NR_uname];

    // unprotect sys_call_table memory page
    pte = lookup_address((unsigned long) _sys_call_table, &level);

    // change PTE to allow writing
    set_pte_atomic(pte, pte_mkwrite(*pte));

    printk("+ unprotected kernel memory page containing sys_call_table\n");

    // now overwrite the __NR_uname entry with address to our uname
    _sys_call_table[__NR_uname] = (sys_call_ptr_t) hooked_uname;

    printk("+ uname hooked!\n");

    return 0;

void cleanup_module() {
    if(orig_uname != NULL) {
        // restore sys_call_table to original state
        _sys_call_table[__NR_uname] = (sys_call_ptr_t) orig_uname;

        // reprotect page
        set_pte_atomic(pte, pte_clear_flags(*pte, _PAGE_RW));

    printk("+ Unloading module\n");

Building and Running the Code

Note: This module unprotects and overwrites portions of kernel memory space. I recommend testing it in a VM.

  1. git clone
  2. cd linux-syscall-hooker
  3. make
  4. insmod ./my_module.ko
  5. uname

If it worked, the output of uname should be "All ur base r belong to us". If it didn't work, check dmesgfor details.

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The symbol of sys_call_table is no longer exported since Linux 2.6.x, we have to HACK it Ever since








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